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To evaluate the effect of an R&D subsidy one needs to know what the subsidized firms 
would have done without the incentive. This paper studies an Italian programme of subsidies 
for the applied development of innovations, exploiting a discontinuity in programme 
financing due to an unexpected shortage of public money. To identify the effect of the 
programme, the study implements a regression discontinuity design and compares firms that 
applied for funding before and after the shortage occurred. The results indicate that the 
programme was not effective in stimulating innovative investment.  
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1 
 
Stimulation of innovation activity is considered a very important task for policymakers.
2 The theoretical case 
for public intervention to stimulate R&D is clear. As the social returns from innovation are usually greater 
than the private ones, private firms allocate fewer resources to it than is required by the social optimum. 
Notwithstanding this sound rationale, past empirical literature shows that the evidence on the effectiveness 
of subsidies is highly controversial. This is partly due to the intrinsic difficulty of the evaluation exercise, 
which requires addressing the question of what would have happened without the subsidies.  
 
What would the firm have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy? On one hand, a financially 
constrained firm would have spent less money. Since such a firm cannot finance the whole project without 
the subsidy, which lowers the private share of financing, the project would not have been implemented.
3 On 
the other hand, a financially unconstrained firm would have spent a greater amount of private money had it 
not received the subsidy. As such a firm can finance the project from external or internal funds, the subsidy 
is in fact superfluous (it crowds out private R&D expenditures). Since the cost of the subsidy for the firm is 
substantially lower than that of alternative sources of financing, both constrained and unconstrained firms will 
ask for the subsidy. Given the difficulty of making a subsidy conditional on a firm’s being constrained, there is 
no guarantee of the programme’s effectiveness, which can only be evaluated ex post. 
 
In theory, the best way to evaluate effectiveness is randomization: the agency in charge of the programme 
identifies a group of “potential beneficiaries” and randomly awards subsidies within this group, so the 
probability of receiving the subsidy is the same for of its members. In fact, however, randomization schemes 
are almost never implemented, and so to evaluate effectiveness researchers have to rely on identification 
strategies that aim at reproducing the fundamental feature of a random design as closely as possible (see 
the vast literature on programme evaluation; among others, Lee and Lemieux, 2010, Imbens and Rubin, 
forthcoming, Banerjee and Duflo, 2009, Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).
4 As underscored by Duflo et al. 
(2007), exogenous events sometimes result in elements of randomization being introduced into programmes 
not originally designed as random schemes. This study elaborates on one of these circumstances. 
 
We evaluate an Italian programme of subsidies for technological innovation (Fund for Technological 
Innovation; FTI or Fund, hereafter), which was not designed through a random scheme. The FTI allocated its 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Andrea Bonaccorsi, Raffaele Brancati, Raffaello Bronzini, Luigi Cannari, Francesco Caselli, Gaia 
Garino, Saul Lach, Giovanni Paci, Gianfranco Viesti, the participants at the Seminario di analisi economica territoriale 
(Bank of Italy, December 2009), the Workshop on the evaluation of firms’ incentives (Bank of Italy, April 2010), the 
conference Il sistema produttivo di fronte alla crisi: le imprese, le industrie, le istituzioni (University of Parma, June 2010), 
the 16th congress of the Associacao Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento Regional (University of Madeira, July 2010), 
the XXV National Conference of Labour Economics (University “G. d’Annunzio,” September 2010), the XXII Riunione 
Scientifica SIEP (University of Pavia, September 2010) for comments and suggestions, and Daniel Dichter for the 
editorial assistance. We are indebted to the Italian Ministry for Economic Development for provided us with the official 
archive of the Fund for Technological Innovations. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2 This is particularly true in Italy, where there is less private spending on R&D than in other advanced countries (in 2000, 
it amounted to 0.5 per cent of GDP). 
3 Compared with more traditional investments, there may be a greater likelihood that profitable R&D projects will not find 
adequate financing, owing to their higher variance of success probabilities. This could make their returns harder to 
identify, particularly for non-specialist external financiers such as commercial banks. 
4 Admittedly, it is not easy to understand why this is the case. For instance, Jaffe (2002, p. 28) writes. “I remain 
personally puzzled as to why it is okay to randomize when people’s lives are the stake (drug trials), but not when 
research money is at the stake.”  
  5subsidies among applicant firms on the basis of a technical committee’s selection of the most promising 
research proposals. At a certain point, however, the financing of the programme was unexpectedly 
interrupted by a shortage of public money. Firms were still allowed to apply for the subsidies, because it was 
hoped that the problems would soon be resolved. As things turned out, applications were suspended after 
ten months  but it took five years to reinstate funding. Our strategy will basically compare firms that received 
the subsidies before the shortage with firms that applied in the subsequent 10-month period and were not 
assessed by the committee for five years. Thus, we compare firms that passed the assessment (treated 
group) with firms that did not go through the assessment process because of the suspension (control group). 
We argue that being in one group or the other was essentially a matter of luck, and that this was particularly 
true for firms that applied around the day financing was interrupted. The unexpected shortage of funds 
allows us to empirically implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that uses the date of the 
application as the forcing variable and the day the shortage occurred as the cutoff.  
 
As for results, we find no evidence of the programme’s effectiveness. The subsidized firms do not invest 
more in either tangible or intangible assets than the firms whose assessment was suspended. Therefore, in 
the experience of the FTI public funding simply substitutes for private funding. This result is highly robust to a 
number of sensitivity checks. While the effects of the programme on the sales, profitability and financial 
conditions of the firms are also negligible, we find a positive impact on the overall size of the balance sheet, 
which suggests that money saved on R&D was spent on alternative assets. Finally, the programme’s 
effectiveness is not greater for firms that typically have a higher likelihood of being rationed by private 
lenders (for example, small and medium-sized enterprises or firms with high borrowing costs). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the past literature on the topic. Section 3 
describes the characteristics of the policy measure, Section 4 describes the data and sketches the 
methodology, Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The main reasons why private management of R&D may be socially inefficient are discussed by Arrow 
(1962): the external acquisition of knowledge is not always regulated by market mechanisms and agents 
cannot prevent observation and interaction from other agents, a phenomenon known as spillovers from 
knowledge in the literature; the social returns from innovation are therefore usually greater than the private 
ones and the resources allocated by agents to innovate are smaller than the socially optimal amount. Public 
subsidies therefore allow to reduce the gap between private and social returns. 
 
Hall (2002) reviews the most important contributions about the effects of financial constraints on the 
financing of innovations. R&D investments are risky and subject to asymmetric information between firms 
and lenders; a higher interest rate than that equating demand and supply of credit can help lenders to 
discriminate between good and bad projects, at the social cost of a suboptimal overall credit amount. Public 
intervention through a concessional loan can loosen the financial constraints. 
 
  6The empirical evidence about the efficacy of R&D subsidies has been widely discussed.Results are mixed. 
David, et al. (2000) examine the results of forty years of empirical studies and find that there is no conclusive 
evidence in favour of public support. In the analysis of the Small Business Innovation Research program in 
the U.S., Wallsten (2000) finds that public grants displace firm expenditures dollar for dollar. Lach (2002), on 
a panel of Israeli firms, shows that subsidies have been effective for small firms, while the policy had a 
negative effect on large firms. Gonzalez et al. (2005) in analysing Spanish data find that only a small subset 
of firms would not have undertaken R&D activity in the absence of the subsidy, while there is no evidence of 
crowding out among the innovation active firms. Gorg and Strobl (2007), using an Irish sample of firms, 
conclude that public subsidies replace private R&D expenditure when the award is substantial. Czarnitzki et 
al. (2007) find a positive effect of cooperation on the effectiveness of subsidies in a panel of firms from 
Germany and Finland. 
 
In contrast with such a wide range of international empirical literature, very few studies examine the efficacy 
of Italian R&D policies, even if the number of interventions and the amount of public resources involved have 
been relevant in the last decades. Merito et al. (2008) evaluate the efficacy of the subsidies awarded in 2000 
by the Special Fund for Applied Research of the Ministry of University and Research, introduced with the aim 
of supporting the research component of industrial R&D; they find that four years after the award of the 
subsidy, the policy had had little effect on number of employees, sales, productivity, labour costs and patent 
applications. Fantino and Cannone (2010) examine the efficacy of two European regional programs aiming 
at supporting innovative activity of small and medium firms in Piedmont and find limited effectiveness. 
Bronzini and Iachini (2010) when considering another regional program in Emilia Romagna find a positive 
effect only for small firms. 
 
3. The Fund for Technological Innovation 
 
Main features. – The Fund for Technological Innovation was set up in 2001 with the mission of “stimulating 
the applied development of innovations through subsidies to the R&D activity of firms.” It functions along 
lines similar to those of other commercial research grant programmes, widely implemented all over the world. 
A high-level executive agency (in our case, the Ministry for Economic Development) is in charge, setting the 
rules of the game. Firms apply by submitting substantive R&D proposals.
5 A technical committee organized 
by the agency meets, reviews the proposals and provides a judgment on their merits. On the basis of this 
judgment, the Ministry decides whether to grant the subsidy. If a proposal is rejected, the Ministry explains 
the reasons adduced by the committee. There is no deadline for applications, which are evaluated one by 
one in chronological order of receipt.  
 
The Fund focuses on applied innovations. While an R&D proposal may have both a research component 
and a development component, the Fund’s area of responsibility only refers to the latter.
6 If the research 
                                                 
5 The applications are preliminarily vetted by private banks, which have to express an opinion on the economic and 
financial soundness of the applicant firm and the project. This preliminary report is sent to the Ministry, along with the 
R&D proposal. The technical committee reviews both the proposal and the preliminary report to express its judgment. 
The bank assessment is quite uninformative. According to a Ministry official involved in implementing the FTI, the bank 
assessment is almost always highly favourable.  
6 According to OECD (2002), “research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new 
knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts. Development is systematic work, drawing 
  7costs are preponderant, the application is not handled by the Ministry for Economic Development but by the 
Ministry for Universities and Research.
7 
 
The overall amount of subsidy is equal to the upper bound allowed by the European Union (EU), which is 50 
per cent for research costs and 25 per cent for development costs.
8 As the projects managed by the Ministry 
have development costs equal to at least a 50.1 per cent share of total costs, they receive a subsidy of 
between 25 and 37.5 per cent. The subsidy can be augmented up to an additional 25 per cent overall in the 
following cases: small and medium-sized enterprises,
9 firms located in underdeveloped areas (defined 
according to EU regional policy objectives 1 and 2), projects included in the objectives of the EU Research 
Framework Programmes, and projects carried out in cooperation with other firms or public research 
organizations. The stated cost of the project can include expenditures for labour, machinery, consulting, 
overheads and consumption costs, feasibility studies and research centre organization. The investment must 
begin between 12 months before and 6 months after the date of the application. The project must be 




The unexpected shortage. – The Fund began operations on 27 October 2001 (see Figure 1) and ran 
smoothly through 17 March 2002. The next day the financing programme’s was unexpectedly interrupted. 
The Ministry’s no longer had current resources available, since the allocations were exhausted and the 
Treasury had not transferred funds to it. Nevertheless, the Ministry allowed firms to continue to apply for 
subsidies, in the hope that the financing problems could soon be resolved. But the public finance problems 
proved to be more severe and applications were suspended on 13 January 2003. Only at the end of 2007 
was the Ministry in a position to reconsider the R&D proposals submitted to it between 18 March 2002 and 
13 January 2003. At that time the applicant firms were notified that the Ministry was ready to start the 






                                                                                                                                                                  
on existing knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, 
products or devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those already 
produced or installed”. 
7 This ministry is in charge of the Fund for Support to Research. An evaluation of the effectiveness of subsidies for 
projects with a prevailing research component can be found in Merito et al. (2008). 
8 The subsidy is a combination of a concessionary loan covering 60 per cent of the subsidy at 1/5 the market rate of 
interest and a grant for the remainder. The loan amortization period cannot exceeded ten years, plus a grace period 
during the execution of the project. 
9 The Ministry uses the following criteria to identify small and medium-sized enterprises: the firm must have less than 250 
employees, be independent and have total annual sales revenue of less than €40 million or total assets of less than €27 
million in the last financial year. 
10 The subsidies are disbursed in tranches, the financial plan may include up to five installments. The payment is made 
within 60 days of the firm’s certification of the expenses covered, but small and medium-sized enterprises may request 
upfront payment of the initial installments. 
  84. Data and methodology 
 
Sources. – Our main data source is the Ministry for Economic Development’s official archive of the FTI 
programme, which includes the 879 applications submitted until 17 March 2002 and funded and the 1,242 
applications submitted after the cutoff date.
11 To ensure greater homogeneity we only consider 
manufacturing firms (around 80 per cent of the firms in the archive). The version of the archive released to us 
has records for: i) firms that applied between 27 October 2001 and 17 March 2002 and received the 
subsidy;
12 ii) all the firms that applied between 18 March 2002 and 13 January 2003, whose assessment was 
suspended. For each firm the archive includes the following information: name, address, tax number, amount 
of the planned R&D expenditure, amount of the subsidy (with a breakdown between grant and 
concessionary loan), the development component’s share of total R&D expenditure. For the subsidized 
projects alone, it also makes available the project’s starting date and completion date. We link the FTI 
archive with the Cerved datasets of financial statements to reconstruct an uninterrupted sample from 1999 to 
2007.
13 In the linking procedure, firm identifier (tax number) misprints, the unavailability of balance-sheet 




Outcome variable. – We do not have data on R&D expenditures. Thus, we have to use financial statement 
data to measure the outcome variable. An important issue is where R&D expenditures end up in the financial 
statements. An R&D project can include a number of items (labour and services costs, physical capital, 
intangible capital) that may be recorded in either the balance sheet or the profit and loss account, according 
to management’s preference. Luckily for us, Italian accounting rules (see Pisoni et al., 2009) envisage that 
for the projects in which the development share of costs is preponderant, all the costs (even those with a 
single-year utility) have to be capitalized and stated in the balance sheet as tangible or intangible 
investments. Therefore, as our main outcome variable we select total investment (over initial capital) as 
recorded in the balance sheet. 
 
Timing of investment. – We compare subsidized firms with firms that applied from 18 March 2002 on, when 
the assessment process was suspended. As explained above, FTI rules envisage that the project must start 
between 12 months before and 6 months after the application date and be completed between 18 and 48 
month after from the application date (firms may request a one-year extension for completion). The Ministry’s 
archive includes the actual timing of the subsidized investment. For the comparison, we need to figure out 
what the investment time profile of the suspended-assessment firms would have been had they decided to 
carry out the project anyway. 
                                                 
11 The overall shares of applications from Northern, Central and South Italy are respectively 70, 25 and 5 per cent. The 
distribution is very similar for funded and not funded firms. 
12 Data on rejected firms were not released because of confidentiality. Italian privacy law envisages disclosure of the 
names of the firms that receive public money, but this does not apply to unsuccessful applicants. The Ministry feared that 
disclosing their names might be taken as signaling low quality of their investment prospects. As no assessment was 
conducted for the firms that applied between 18 March 2002 and 13 January 2003, the names of these firms were 
released without difficulty. 
13 The Cerved dataset does not include partnerships, but only companies; anyway, around 95 per cent of the firms of the 
initial sample of the Ministry were present in the Cerved dataset in at least one year and therefore this fact should not 
introduce any relevant bias in the composition of the final sample. 
14 To remove outliers, we dropped the firms in the 1
st and the 99
th percentile of the distribution of outcome variable.  
Firms involved in mergers and acquisitions during the period were also excluded.  
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[Figure 2] 
 
If we had no data on the actual beginning and completion times, we could have inferred that subsidized firms 
could have started their project anytime between 27 October 2000 and 17 September 2002 and completed it 
between 27 April 2003 (for a project submitted on the earlier date and completed in 18 months) and 17 
March 2007 (for a 48-month project submitted on the latest date and extended for additional 12 months; 
Figure 2). As we have data for the treated firms on the actual investment timing (Figure 3), we can check 
how closely the hypothetical timings approximate the actual timings. We find that the approximation is very 
close: all the subsidized firms began their projects by the end of 2002, while no project was initiated before 1 
January 2001;
15 in the years 2003, 2004, 2005 an increasing share of firms completed the project. By the 
end of 2006 all firms had completed it. 
 
Suppose now that the suspended-assessment firms carried out the project anyway. What should we have 
observed? For these firms the hypothetical investment time-line can be inferred in the same way as for the 
subsidized firms pretending we had no data. Accordingly, these firms would have started their project 
anytime between 18 March 2001 and 13 July 2003 and completed it anytime between 18 September 2003 
(for a project submitted on the earliest date and completed in 18 months) and 13 January 2008 (for a 48-




As shown in Figure 2, there is a substantial overlap between the investment time pattern of the treated firms 
and that of the control firms, had they implemented the project anyway. For both, the projects should have 
been substantially completed by the end of 2007. By comparing cumulative investment over the period 
2001-2007 between treated and suspended-assessment firms, we should therefore be able to detect 
whether the subsidy made some additional investment possible. Subsidized projects started before the 
counterfactual ones: at the end of 2006, when the bulk of the subsidized project had been completed, some 
counterfactual projects – if implemented – could have been in the process of being completed. In the 
empirical section we deal with the possibility that subsidized firms may have initiated their projects some 
months in advance of those in the control group by estimating the effect of the subsidies only for the firms 
that applied just a few days before or after the day when the unexpected shortage occurred.  
 
Note, however, that the 2001-2007 comparison could be upwardly biased because of time substitution (see: 
Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006). This occurs if some subsidized firms moved up investment projects in order to 
take advantage of the incentives. As the suspended-assessment firms did not receive the incentive, they 
may have decided to implement their project according to the original timetable. The upward bias due to the 
potential of time substitution means that if we find a positive effect of the subsidies, our results must be 
deemed inconclusive. 
 
                                                 
15 Although the Fund may consider projects already under way, only 5 per cent of the subsidized projects had been 
initiated before the application was submitted. 
  10Missing data on rejected applicants. – Since we do not have data on firms that applied unsuccessfully before 
the day of the unexpected shortage, we will basically compare firms that received a positive assessment 
from the technical committee with firms that did not go through the committee’s assessment.
16 As 
underscored by Lach (2002), government bureaucrats are under strong pressure to avoid the appearance of 
wasting public funds and therefore tend to fund projects with higher probabilities of success and clearly 
identifiable results. Indeed, it is very hard to believe that the committee’s assessment was systematically 
biased in favour of projects of lower quality. Consequently, the R&D projects of the treated firms could be 
better than those of the control firms, which include both projects that would have been found valid and 
projects that would have been rejected. It could therefore be possible that unsubsidized lower-quality 
projects were not implemented. This implies that there are reasons to believe that our results may be 
upwardly biased. The upward bias due to the unavailability of data on rejected applicants means that if we 
find a positive effect of the subsidies, our results must be deemed inconclusive.  
 
Regression discontinuity design. – To estimate whether the subsidies allowed investments to be made that 
otherwise would not have been undertaken, we implement a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD). In 
this non-experimental setting the treatment is determined by whether an observed “forcing variable” exceeds 
a known cutoff point. We use the application date as the forcing variable and the day the shortage occurred 
as the cutoff. The main idea behind this research design (see Thistlewaite and Campbell, 1960; Angrist and 
Lavy, 1999; Black, 1999; and van der Klaauw, 2002) is that firms that applied just before the cutoff and those  
that applied just after it have a good degree of similarity. This strategy is deemed preferable to other non-
experimental methods because (see: Lee, 2008) if the applicant firms are unable to precisely manipulate the 
forcing variable, the variation in treatment around the threshold is randomized as if the firms had been 
randomly drawn just below or just above the threshold. An implication of the local randomized result is that 
RDD can be tested like randomized experiments. If the variation in the treatment near the threshold is 
approximately randomized, then all “baseline covariates” – all the variables determined prior to the 
realization of the forcing variable – should have the same distribution just before and after the cutoff. To 
substantiate the empirical strategy, in the next section we show that it is extremely unlikely that applicants 
were able to manipulate the forcing variable and we present a test for the absence of discontinuity in 
baseline characteristics around the threshold. 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
 
Substantiating the identification strategy. – Lee and Lemieux (2010) explain that as long as firms exert some 
control over the forcing variable, albeit not a precise control, the conditions for the validity of an RDD are not 
violated. It is very hard to believe that our firms could have exerted precise control over the forcing variable. 
Some firms may have got wind of the possibility of an impact of financing problems on the functioning of the 
Fund, but the exact day on which the Ministry suspended the assessment was not known. Indeed, while the 
suspension covered applications received from 18 March onwards, it was not notified to the firms until 7 May. 
Furthermore, at the time of the notification the Ministry clearly conveyed the idea that the problems would 
                                                 
16 According to a Ministry official involved in implementing the FTI, the percentage of unsuccessful firms was very low. 
The results provided in Tables 1 and 2 below lend support to this fact as the baseline covariates of the two groups of 
firms are balanced around the cutoff. 
  11soon be resolved, since firms were still allowed to apply for the subsidies. Ten months passed before the 
Ministry closed this possibility. Very likely, firms realized at that point that their expectation of being assessed 
soon had been misplaced.
17 To corroborate the supposition that firms might have had (at most) an imprecise 
control over the forcing variable, Figure 4 illustrates the daily number of applications submitted by date. It is 
about 7 in the pre-shortage period and 4 in the post-shortage period and increases somewhat around the 
cutoff date (day 0), though remaining well balanced on the two sides. The only visible outlier (16 
applications) refers to the first day for the submission of applications (5 November 2001). Note also that that 
the daily number of applications increased to some extent towards the end of 2002, before the possibility of 





We also formally test for the presence of a density discontinuity at the threshold by performing a McCrary 
test. This test, which is based on kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density of the forcing 
variable run on both sides of the threshold separately (see McCrary, 2008), finds no discontinuity.
19,20  
 
A key implication of the RDD framework (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010) is that its validity can be tested by 
examining whether observed baseline covariates are locally balanced on either side of the cutoff. This 
evidence would substantiate the idea that the assignment of the treatment near the cutoff is approximately 
randomized. Table 1 presents for both treated and control firms means, standard deviations and mean 
differences between the two groups for a number of baseline covariates referring to 2000, the year before 
the programme was announced (the year before realization of the forcing variable). Following previous 
literature, the table displays the following variables: net overall investment (over 1999 capital), net intangible 
investment (over 1999 intangible capital), (log of) sales, (log of) assets, long-term debt (over assets), cash 
flow (over assets), average interest costs, ROA. Panel A considers the full sample of 751 firms. We find that 
the baseline covariates are roughly balanced on the two sides of the cutoff. However, average interest costs 
for treated firms are higher than for control firms. Panel B focuses on a sample of bandwidth (-90 days, +90 
days) around the cutoff. As in Lalive (2008), the bandwidth is heuristically chosen to obtain a sample size 
equal to half of the full sample. Differences in covariates are again insignificant overall, with the sole 




                                                 
17 In a randomized setting, potential treated are notified shortly whether they are randomized in or out. In the FTI setting 
suspended-assessment firms realize they are not involved in the programme with a delay ranging from a few days (for 
firms that applied just before the suspension of applications) to 10 months (for firms that apply just after the shortage 
took place).  
18 This fact might suggest some sorting occurring before the option of applying expired. Perhaps, the possibility that the 
financing problems could have been more severe than initially envisaged permeated and this might have pushed some 
firms to rush to applying. As it will be shown in the empirical section, our estimates are robust to methods that exploit 
only the information in a limited neighborhood of days around the cutoff. Therefore, potential sorting at the end of the 
period in which firms were allowed to apply does not seem to impact on our estimates. 
19 The jump in density at the threshold was estimated by using three different optimal bandwidths (15.5, 31 and 62 days). 
The point estimates were 1.13 (standard error 1.62), 1.61 (2.70), and -1.04 (1.17), respectively. 
20 We are aware that a density test may have low explanatory power if manipulation occurs on both sides of the cutoff. 
However, there is no reason why firms would have been sorted after the cutoff. 
 
  12 
As recognized by Lee and Lemieux (2010), with a large set of covariates some of the differences will be 
statistically significant by random chance. It is then useful to combine the multiple tests into a single test 
statistic to see if the data are consistent with random treatment around the cutoff. Table 2 presents the 
results we obtain with seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) where each equation (with a function form as 
in equation (1) below) represents a different baseline covariate. A 
2 test for discontinuity gaps in all the 






Results. – Figure 5 reports the cumulative (2001-2007) investment over initial capital by the application date. 
The evidence is based on the 329 subsidized firms (at the left of the threshold) and the 422 suspended-
assessment firms (at the right of the threshold) of the full sample. We graph the mean of the outcome 
variable for each value of the discrete forcing variable (the application date). The figure superimposes the fit 
of a linear regression allowing for a discontinuity at the cutoff and linear trends in the forcing variable on both 
sides of the cutoff. From the figure it seems there is only a minor jump in the outcome variable at the cutoff. 
The jump would indicate that the investment activity of the financed firms is even lower than that of the 




We turn now to more formal measures of the effect of the subsidy. As noted, RDD focuses on identifying the 
discontinuity in investments at the cutoff c. We start by using the following linear regression: 
 
(1)       Ii = 0 + 1 Di + 0 (Xi-c) + 1 Di (Xi-c) + i  
                                                
 
The parameter 1 measures the average causal effect of the FTI subsidies on investment at the cutoff c. The 
parameters 0  and  1 capture the direct effects of the forcing variable X on the outcome I. The crucial issue 
in RDD estimation is the specification of the correlation between the outcome I and the forcing variable X. 
We propose two ways to assess whether the two-sided linear model specification (1) is appropriate. First, we 
parametrically evaluate the sensitivity of the results by augmenting the regression with quadratic and cubic 
terms in (X-c). Second, we move to non-parametric estimates (Pagan and Ullah, 1999) by running local 
linear regressions (Hahn et al., 2001) and estimating a triangular kernel (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). By relying 
only on outcomes from the firms that applied near the cutoff, the non-parametric results also provide 
robustness with respect to the circumstance that some subsidized firms started their project earlier than the 
control firms could have done. 
 
Table 3 presents the regression results regarding the effect of the FTI subsidy on investment. Column (1) 
reports an estimate that compares average 2001-2007 cumulative investment on both sides of the cutoff. 
 
21 For these regressions, we also performed a robustness analysis similar to that reported in Table 3 below, with no 
modifications for our results. 
  13The results indicate that investment by the subsidized firms is greater than that by the suspended-
assessment firms (the estimate would amount to a 5 per cent annual difference)
22. However, the estimate is 
not statistically significant. The second column reports the results from the basic model of equation (1). The 
estimated impact now turns out to be negative, but remains insignificant. Columns (3) and (4) report the 
results from the quadratic and cubic specifications, respectively. Again, there seems to be no effect of the 
FTI incentive. Column (5) describes local linear regression results, where model (1) is estimated over a 90-
day bandwidth subsample. The results remain undisputed.
23 Column (6) reports estimation of a triangle 
kernel. As suggested by Fan and Gijbels (1996), for boundary estimation a triangular kernel is more efficient 
than the more standard rectangular kernel, as the former assigns more weight to the observations closer to 
the cutoff point. The 12-day bandwidth is chosen using the rule of thumb procedure proposed by Silverman 
(1986). The estimated impact of the treatment is negative and not significant. The results of this 
nonparametric estimation are also plotted in Figure 6. 
 
Column (7) adds to the baseline specification of Column (2) a number of covariates. We include a set of 
dummy variables for the location of the firm (at the region level) and a set of two-digit industry dummies. The 
effect at the cutoff is basically zero. Column (8) provides the estimate of the impact by comparing cumulative 
investment over 2001-2006 instead of 2001-2007. This comparison is clearly biased in favour of finding a 
positive effect: at the end of 2006, when the bulk of the subsidized projects had been completed, some of the 





So far, the results show there is no increase in total investment as a consequence of receipt of the subsidy. 
Note, however, that the outcome variable – total investment – reflects not only the R&D expenditures for 
which the subsidy was granted or only requested, but also the additional investment that the firm has 
undertaken during the 2001-2007 period. For instance, suspended-application firms possibly chose to 
implement more traditional investments instead of unsubsidized R&D and this could explain why the overall 
effect is zero. To check for this possibility Column (9) uses as a dependent variable the ratio of intangible 
investment to intangible capital. In contrast with total investment, intangibles may be seen as more strictly 
related to R&D expenditures. As we fail to find any effect for intangible investment as well (the impact is 
negative albeit insignificant), we conclude that substitution between R&D investment and less innovative 
investment is not the reason behind our results.
24 
 
Table 4 presents the result we obtain by using alternative outcomes. For the sake of brevity, we only present 
the analogues to those of Table 2, Column (2). Consistently with the fact that firms get subsidies for projects 
they would have undertaken even without the subsidy, we fail to find in the considered period 2001-2007 any 
                                                 
22 We examine the effect on the amount of general investments and therefore we cannot exclude the existence of 
differences in the qualitative composition of investments, in particular on their degree of innovativeness. Some hints 
regarding the composition come from considering the intangible component of investments in column (9) of the table; the 
results are confirmed. 
23 Estimates are insensitive to using smaller bandwidth.  
24 We also tried different specifications for the outcome variables (levels and growth rates of both overall and intangible 
investment). Results were very similar to those presented. 
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significant effect on sales, financial conditions of the firm (long-term debt over assets and cash flow over 
assets).
25 We also find no effect on the average interest rate charged by external financiers and on ROA. 
Finally, we find a positive impact on the overall size of the balance sheet, which suggests that money saved 




Table 5 displays the results obtained by splitting the sample along some potentially interesting dimensions. 
For instance, economic reasoning suggests that the effectiveness of subsidies should be greater for firms 
that are more likely to be rationed by private lenders, such as small enterprises or firms with high borrowing 
costs (see Guiso, 1998). Moreover, the rules determining the level of the subsidy imply that small firms are 
those with the highest intensity of subsidy. As a matter of fact, we fail to find signs of effectiveness even 
when we only consider these types of firm. Again, an argument made by practitioners is that R&D subsidies 
are usually wasteful, unless they can be targeted to firms already having a sufficient know-how in innovation 
activity. To check for this possibility, we estimate the impact of the programme only for the subsample of 





Innovation is commonly invoked as one of the main engines of growth. Accordingly, policy for innovation at 
national and international level routinely highlight the role of public support for innovation.
26 Beyond public 
declarations and legitimate hopes, however, little is known about the effectiveness of public spending to 
foster private R&D. The reason is that to evaluate the effects of government-sponsored programmes it is 
necessary to address the intrinsically difficult counterfactual question of what would have happened without 
the subsidies. In principle, a ready-to-implement method to provide a decisive answer to the key 
counterfactual question is available: it is randomization. In practice, this method is almost never used, so 
researchers have long been struggling with identification strategies that aim at reproducing the fundamental 
feature of a random design as closely as possible. Exogenous events sometimes introduce some elements 
of randomization into programmes that were not originally designed as random schemes. This study 
elaborates on one of these circumstances: the unexpected shortage of funds that occurred with the Italian 
Fund for Technological Innovation. We compare firms that received the subsidies before the shortage with 
firms that applied after it and then saw assessment of their application suspended. Since being in one group 
or the other essentially a matter of luck, especially for firms that applied near the day when funds were cut 
off, we implement a regression discontinuity design. 
 
Our results point to a simple conclusion: there is no evidence of effectiveness whatsoever. Compared with 
suspended-assessment firms, subsidized firms do not invest more in either tangible or intangible assets. 
Basically, subsidized firms get subsidies for projects that would have been undertaken even without the 
subsidy. 
 
25 We are not able to exclude that the real effects of the policy on some variables, in particular on sales, may require 
more time to be detected and therefore they may be delayed after 2007. 
26 For instance, R&D is one of the priorities of the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy. Tables and figures 
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Figure 2 
Hypothetical timeline of investment 
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Sources: Ministry for Economic Development and Cerved. Note: the x axis shows the number of days before or after 
the suspension (day 0) of assessment of the applications. 
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Sources: Ministry for Economic Development and Cerved. 
  20Figure 6 
The effect of FTI subsidies on investment: nonparametric estimates 
 
 
Sources: Ministry for Economic Development and Cerved. 
 
  21Table 1 
Mean differences in the pre-treatment year 
   Full sample  Sample restricted to 90 days around cutoff 
















Net overall investment over capital 9.5942  9.4847  0.1095  0.24  9.5717 9.4682  0.1036  0.46 
Net intangible investment over intangible capital 9.5102  9.3927  0.1175  0.22 9.4948 9.3829  0.1119  0.44 
log(Sales) 0.6477  0.4110  0.2367 0.37  0.7054  0.4503 0.2551  0.64 
log(Assets) 0.7518  1.0336  -0.2818 0.28  0.7079  0.7840 -0.0761  0.81 
Long-term debt over assets  0.1128  0.1047 0.0081 0.29  0.1149  0.1049 0.0100  0.39 
Cash flow over assets  0.0892  0.0883 0.0009 0.84  0.0853  0.0892 -0.0038  0.56 
Average debt cost  0.0383  0.0338  0.0044 0.05  0.0404  0.0330 0.0074  0.08 
ROA 0.0819  0.0781  0.0038  0.46 0.0775 0.0774  0.0001  0.98 
                
Number of observations  329  422      239  126     
Sources: Ministry for Economic Development and Cerved. Note: all variables refer to the year immediately before treatment (2000) except capital and intangible capital 
(which refer to 1999). 
 
  22Table 2 
SUR estimates of discontinuity of covariates 
 (1)  (2) 
   Full sample  Sample restricted to 90 
days around cutoff 
0.1126 -0.0953  Net overall investment over 
capital  (0.1531) (0.2189) 
0.1488 -0.0244  Net intangible investment 








Long-term debt over assets 
(0.0128) (0.0182) 
-0.0072 -0.0121 
Cash flow over assets 
(0.0072) (0.0102) 
0.0083** 0.0099 





      

2  7.63 6.67 
p-value 0.47  0.57 
Number of observations  751  365 
Sources: Ministry for Economic Development and Cerved. Notes: all variables refer to the 
year immediately before treatment (2000) except capital and intangible capital (which refer to 
1999). The standard errors, clustered by technological level of the sectors (OECD definition), 
are reported in brackets. The number of asterisks shows the statistical significance of the 
coefficient: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 99%. 
  23Table 3 
The effect of FTI subsidies on investment 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treatment effect  0.3569  -0.2082  0.1463  0.2996  0.5482 -0.2458 -0.0759 -0.1115 -0.1946 
    (0.3038) (0.1901) (0.9533) (0.7554) (0.8462) (0.6482) (0.1982) (0.0901) (1.3174) 
Polynomial  order  0 1 2 3 1    1 1 1 
Bandwidth  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  90 days  12 days  ∞  ∞  ∞ 





















Period  2001-2007 2001-2007 2001-2007 2001-2007 2001-2007 2001-2007 2001-2007 2001-2006 2001-2007 
           
R
2  0.003 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.017  0.052  0.011  0.007 
Number of 
observations  751 751 751 751 365 751 751 751 751 
Sources: Ministry for Economic Development and Cerved. Notes: all variables refer to the period shown except capital and intangible capital (which refer to 1999). The 
standard errors are reported in brackets. In column (6) standard errors are calculated by bootstrap; in the other columns they are clustered by technological level (OECD 
definition). The number of asterisks shows the statistical significance of the coefficient: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 99%. 
  24Table 4 
The effect of FTI subsidies on alternative outcomes 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 





debt cost  ROA 
Treatment effect  0.0388  0.1200**  -0.0086 -0.0024  0.0021  -4.7925 
   (0.0620)  (0.0603)  (0.0119)  (0.0034)  (0.0028)  (3.3395) 
Polynomial order  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Bandwidth  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞ 
Control variables  no  no  No  No  no  no 
Period 2001-2007  2001-2007  2001-2007  2001-2007  2001-2007  2001-2007 
            
R
2 0.0020  0.0044  0.0108  0.0012  0.0037  0.0037 
Number of 
observations  751 751  751  751  751 751 
Source: Ministry for Economic Development and Cerved. Notes: all variables refer to the period shown except capital 
and intangible capital (which refer to 1999). The standard errors, clustered by technological level (OECD definition), are 
reported in brackets. The number of asterisks shows the statistical significance of the coefficient: *  90%; **  95%; 
*** 99%. 
  25Table 5 
The effect of FTI subsidies: subsamples 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Small and medium-
sized firms   High–capital-cost firms  Intangible-asset-intensive 
firms  
Treatment effect  -0.0720  -0.2008  -0.2649 
   (0.1473)  (0.4125)  (0.4746) 
Polynomial order  1  1  1 
Bandwidth  ∞  ∞  ∞ 
Control variables  no  no  no 
Dependent 
variable  Overall investments  Overall investments Overall  investments 
Period 2001-2007  2001-2007  2001-2007 
      
R
2 0.0199  0.0007  0.0082 
No. observations  533  368  386 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development and Cerved. Balanced panel. Notes: all variables are referred 
to the shown period except capital and intangible capital (referred to 1999). The standard errors, 
clustered by technological level (OECD definition), are reported in brackets. The number of asterisks 
shows the statistical significance of the coefficient: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 99%. 
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